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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VIRGIL MOORE, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENIDMAN, Chief, ] 
Drivers License Services, ] 
State of Utah, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
i Case No. 870248-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the 
petition and to reinstate the driving privileges of the 
plaintiff-appellant based upon the fact that the trial court 
did not receive into evidence any document which was a sworn 
report filed within five days after the date of arrest with the 
Division of Driver License Services? 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing the respondent 
to question the plaintiff concerning prior DUI arrests? 
3. Did the evidence sustain the Court's finding that 
the defendant-respondent had met the burden of proof? 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
Under §78-2(a)-3, Utah Code Annotated (effective 
December 31, 1987), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on 
the grounds that this case involves an appeal from a final order 
of a District Court review of a state agency, the Drivers License 
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S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n of t h e D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c S a f e t y f o r t h e 
S t a t e of Utah. 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
T h i s i s an a p p e a l f r o m t h e F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , 
C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law and Order e n t e r e d by t h e Honorable Raymond 
S. Uno a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g he ld on March 1 1 , 1987. In t h a t order 
t h e D i s t r i c t Court s u s t a i n e d the d e c i s i o n of the D r i v e r s L i c e n s e 
S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f P u b l i c S a f e t y and 
c o n t i n u e d t h e s u s p e n s i o n of t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t ' s d r i v i n g 
p r i v i l e g e s which was f i r s t e n t e r e d on October 4 , 1984 . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The plaintiff-appellant submits that this case can 
be determined under the statutory provision set forth in 
§41-6-44.10, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the hearing on March 11, 1987, the defendant-
respondent proceeded to present the evidence and called as his 
first witness a Salt Lake City police officer, R.K. Sullivan 
(T. 3). 
Officer Sullivan testified that on Sunday, August 5, 
1984, at approximately 3:28 a.m., he arrested the plaintiff-
appellant Virgil Moore. He indicated that he first observed 
a vehicle at about 950 Souia State Street traveling southbound 
in the outside lane when it suddenly took a drastic dive towards 
the curb for no apparent reason. He indicated that he followed 
the vehicle down the roadway noting a slight weaving from side 
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to side. After the vehicle made another sudden movement to avoid 
making contact with barricades located at 1200 South State, he 
again followed the vehicle out on State Street to 1700 South 
where the vehicle made a right-hand turn. He stated that the 
vehicle made a wide turn, crossed over the center line into the 
eastbound lanes of travel and was traveling 48 m.p.h. in a 35 
m.p.h. zone. 
He then pulled over the vehicle and identified Virgil 
Moore as being the person in court who was operating the vehicle 
on the day in question. After testifying concerning his 
detection of slurred speech and the odor of alcoholic beverage, 
he adminstered the field sobriety tests. After the field 
sobriety tests, he placed Mr. Moore under arrest for driving 
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and he testified 
that he requested him to take a chemical test by reading verbatim 
the admonition from the DUI Report Form (T. 9). The officer 
indicated that Mr. Moore said he would take the test, and the 
officer instructed another police officer to transport him to 
the Salt Lake County Jail and adminster a test (T. 10). 
He later indicated that he was informed by the officer 
that the arrested person "had not completed the breath test," 
and so he filled out a report and submitted it to the Drivers 
License Division. The DUI Report Form was not received in 
evidence, and the officer indicated that he did sign a DUI Report 
Form dated August 5, 1984, in his own handwriting which he swore 
to by raising his right hand in front of a notary (T. 10) 
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On cross-examination, the report was marked by the 
attorney for the plaintiff-appellant as Exhibit 1 but was not 
received into evidence. Officer Sullivan indicated that he had 
no personal knowledge of whether or not Mr. Moore did take the 
test. 
Q Do you r e c a l l r e q u e s t i n g t h e o t h e r 
o f f i c e r to go admin i s t e r the t e s t ? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay . And do you r e c a l l f i l l i n g o u t 
the r e p o r t ? 
A Yes . . . . 
Q Does that indicate that the arrested 
person refused to take the test? 
MR. GAITHER: I will object to his conclu-
sions about the document. 
THE COURT: Unless there's more foundation, 
I think that the objection is sustainable. 
MR. HALE: The foundation is he put it down. 
Your Honor. Isn't that correct; officer? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right. I listed 
that on the report. 
On further re-cross examination by counsel for the 
plaintiff-appellant, the officer indicated that he had not heard 
any statements by Mr. Moore or observed Mr. Moore do any acts 
which would cause him to personally reach the conclusion that 
Mr. Moore had refused to take the test prior to the time that 
he filled out the report (T. 18). He did indicate that when 
Mr. Moore was in his presence, he stated that he would take the 
tests. 
6 
At the conclusion of Officer Sullivan's testimony, 
the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant made a motion to strike 
the entire last line of testimony concerning the information 
that Officer Sullivan received from Officer Cracroft about the 
alleged refusal to submit to the test as being hearsay. Counsel 
for the plaintiff-appellant indicated that he understood that 
the information was only being offered to show how the 
information got into the report, but it was hearsay as far as 
witness Sullivan was concerned. The Court indicated that the 
report would not be received until after the testimony of Officer 
Cracroft. 
The next witness called by the State was David 
Cracroft, a police officer for Salt Lake City Police Department 
(T. 20). Officer Cracroft indicated that he was requested by 
Officer Sullivan to take Mr. Moore to the Salt Lake City Police 
Station located in Salt Lake City, Utah, to administer breath 
test. He indicated that he transported him to the place where 
the intoxilyzer was located at the entrance to the jail. He 
indicated that he was certified to operate the test, and he went 
through the standard procedure of running the intoxilyzer machine 
(T. 22). He stated that he put the hose to Mr. Moore's mouth, 
and he blew for just a short period, a second, and then quit 
blowing (T. 22). The officer .estified that Mr. Moore puffed 
his cheeks, blew into the machine for a second and then no more 
air went into the machine, the sample light went out, so no air 
sample was going in the machine. The officer indicated that 
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he told Mr. Moore to blow until he told him to stop, and he did 
not do that. After which he told him, "Stop faking and blow 
into the machine or you could lose your license," (T. 23). He 
stated that Mr. Moore indicated to him that he was blowing, but 
the officer's conclusion was that he did not get any more air. 
At that point he stopped the test. Officer Cracroft indicated 
that he reported back to Officer Sullivan what had occurred 
concerning Mr. Moore's alleged conduct (T. 24). 
On cross-examination the officer testified that there 
was a test record made from the intoxilyzer machine which he 
destroyed immediately after the incident. He indicated that 
he never recalibrated the intoxilyzer machine and had no records 
in court to show whether or not the machine was functioning 
properly at the time the test procedures were being given (T. 
28). He stated that during the testing procedure as well as 
the green light that came on concerning the breath sample that 
the error light kept coming on. When asked whether or not the 
error light meant more than merely insufficient breath sample, 
the officer testified that "in this case it meant there was an 
improper sample, in my opinion. However, if there is a 
malfunction with the machine in any of the steps, the error light 
will come on," (T. 29). He stated that the error light is a 
^ed light that comes on during the testing procedure as opposed 
to the green light concerning the air sample. He stated that 
normally when the light comes on, you have to shut off the 
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machine and turn it back on and start over and recalibrate the 
machine^ which he did not do in this case (T. 30). 
On re-direct he indicated that he followed a checklist 
that is prepared in connection with the intoxilyzer machine but 
that he tore it up at the same time that the test card was torn 
up. On recross-examination the officer indicated that the error 
light came on about five seconds after the test and that there 
was enough time for him to put the tube up, take a short sample, 
remind him to blow again and then tell him that if he did not 
blow that he could lose his license. The officer testified that 
all of these procedures took place within the span of time of 
about five seconds before the error light came on and that it 
took place within a matter of "several seconds," (T. 34). 
When the witness concluded testifying, the defendant-
respondent rested. Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant made 
a motion at that time to dismiss citing §41-6-44.10, U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended), on the grounds that there was no evidence 
of a sworn report admitted into evidence; that the officer did 
not have any personal knowledge at the time the alleged report 
was completed; and that the Court did not have jurisdiction 
because there was no showing that the Driver License Division 
had jurisdiction initially to take the action to suspend the 
petitioner's driving privileges (T. 36). The plaintiff-appellant 
also made a motion to dismiss based upon the fact that no records 
concerning the intoxilyzer machine were introduced to show a 
foundation as to whether or not the machine was working correctly 
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or incorrectly in light of the testimony that an error light 
came on during the procedure. The Court denied the motion to 
dismiss (T„ 41). 
The plaintiff-appellant, Virgil Moore, then took the 
stand and testified that he was arrested on the day in question 
for driving under the influence. Mr. Moore indicated that he 
was told that he was not blowing into the machine but that he 
did blow into the machine at the time in question. 
On cross-examination, the Court, over objection of 
counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, allowed the State to ask 
a question as to whether or not Mr. Moore had ever had a prior 
DUI arrest. The Court overruled the objection and counsel for 
the defendant-respondent was able to ask whether or not on April 
16, 1983, he had been previously requested to take a similar 
test (T. 49). Over another objection by counsel for the 
plaintiff-appellant, the attorney for the defendant-respondent 
was allowed to ask whether or not the officer in the previous 
arrest had contended that he was not blowing properly into the 
machine. Mr. Moore indicated that the officer had previously 
made that contention (T. 51). 
Thereafter, the plaintiff-appellant rested and the 
Court entered an order denying the petition and finding that 
there had been a refusal by the plaintiff-appellant (T. 53). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the 
petition and to reinstate the driving privileges of the 
10 
plaintiff-appellant based upon the fact that the trial court 
did not receive into evidence any document which was a sworn 
report filed within five days after the date of arrest with the 
Division of Driver License Services? 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing the respondent 
to question the plaintiff concerning prior DUI arrests? 
3. Did the evidence sustain the Court's finding that 
the defendant-respondent had met the burden of proof? 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE PETITION AND TO REINSTATE THE DRIVING 
PRIVILEGES OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BASED 
UPON THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
RECEIVE INTO EVIDENCE ANY DOCUMENT WHICH 
WAS A SWORN REPORT FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE DATE OF ARREST WITH THE DIVISION 
OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES. 
The trial court did not have any evidence in this 
matter that the document which was referred to during the 
evidence as a report was ever submitted to the Driver License 
Division within five days after the arrest. The statute clearly 
requires that the report shall be submitted within five days 
from the date of the arrest. The defendant-respondent argued 
that the report was not jurisdictional and that the court did 
not need to receive the report because the matter was a trial 
de novo and sufficient oral testimony was introduced without 
the necessity for any documentation. 
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In the case of Hels ten v. Schwendiman, 668 P.2d 509 
(U tah , 1 9 8 3 ) , t h e Utah Supreme Cour t he ld t h a t in Utah an 
o f f i c e r ' s r e p o r t t h a t i n i t i a t e s the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e revocation 
proceed ings i s a mandatory requirement of the s t a t u t e s . In tha t 
case the Court found t h a t the o f f i c e r ' s r e p o r t was not signed 
i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a n o t a r y and was not a sworn r e p o r t . 
The re fo re , the Court ru led t h a t the document fa i led to sa t i s fy 
the s t a t u t o r y requirement of §41-6-44.10, U.C.A., and the Driver 
L i c e n s e D i v i s i o n r e v o c a t i o n proceed ings based thereon were 
i n v a l i d and the r evoca t ion of the p e r s o n ' s d r iv ing p r iv i l eges 
was a legal n u l l i t y . 
In t h e Utah d e c i s i o n of H e 1 s t e n , the Court c i t e d 
the Oregon case of Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Division, Depart-
ment of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 576 P. 2d 1267 (Ct. App . O r e . , 1978) . 
In t h e Blackburn d e c i s i o n , the Oregon cou r t s t a t e d t h a t the 
e n t i r e p r o c e s s t o w a r d s u s p e n s i o n for r e f u s a l t o t a k e a 
breathalyzer t e s t i s i n i t i a t e d by the "sworn r epor t . " The Oregon 
c o u r t sa id t h a t wi thout t h i s r e p o r t the Oregon Motor Vehicle 
Div i s ion had no a u t h o r i t y to commence the suspension process . 
The Court sa id the sworn r e p o r t i s in essence the basis of the 
D i v i s i o n ' s a u t h o r i t y to cons ider suspens ion . The Court held 
tha t the sworn report i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l requirement. 
In Blackburn the Court went on to s t a t e tha t i t would 
be unnecessary for the Court in the appeal to define the outer 
l i m i t s of the scope of the de novo review in the lower cour t 
of the D i v i s i o n ' s suspension order because of the i r r e g u l a r i t y 
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of the jurisdictional document. In the case of Colman v. 
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah, 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
followed the decision in Helsten and held that the sworn report 
is required to show the validity of the revocation proceedings 
and that if the report is not sworn, the subsequent proceedings 
would be void. In Colman they found that the revocation 
proceedings were a legal nullity because the officer did not 
follow the essential requirements to constitute the taking of 
an oath as required by the statute. 
In matters where the District Court jurisdiction is 
based upon review of the action of an agency, even if the matter 
is on trial for a de novo review, the jurisdiction of the 
District Court is based upon whether or not the agency had 
subject matter jurisdiction. Berry v. Arizona State Land 
Department, 651 P.2d 853 (Ariz., 1982) The District Court in 
an appeal de novo has only the subject matter jurisdiction which 
could be asserted in the administrative hearing from which the 
appeal was taken. It is clear under the statute that if the 
report was not a sworn report or was not submitted within five 
days, the Driver License Division would not have jurisdiction 
to take away the plaintiff-appellant's driving privileges; 
therefore, the District Court would not have the jurisdiction 
to proceed over the subject matter at issue. 
In addition at the hearing before Judge Uno and in 
this appeal, the evidence did not support the conclusion reached 
by the trial court that a sworn report was submitted to the 
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Drivers License Division. The plaintiff-appellant submits that 
the testimony indicated that the officer filled out a document 
entitled "DUI Report Form." On direct the officer merely 
indicated that he signed the DUI Report Form and submitted the 
DUI Report Form to the Driver License Division (T. 10). The 
evidence is completely absent that the document which the officer 
claims was submitted to the Driver License Division was more 
than a DUI Report Form and consisted of a "sworn report" as 
required by the statute. Later during the trial, on redirect 
examination, the attorney for the defendant-respondent attempted 
to elicit from the witness the conclusions contained in the 
documents (T. 17). The Court sustained an objection to the 
officer testifying about the conclusions contained in the 
document. Further questioning revealed that the last sentence 
of the report indicated that the officer may have signed a 
document which stated that the subject violated §41-6-44, U.C.A., 
which is the substantive provision for driving under the 
influence and is not related to the implied consent law (T. 17). 
Therefore, the District Court did not have any 
sufficient competent evidence to make a ruling that a sworn 
report was ever submitted to the Driver License Division. 
This Court should interpret the provision requiring 
thav a sworn report be submitted within five days as jurisdic-
tional as is clearly contemplated by the statute. There are 
many policy reasons for the Legislature enacting such a 
requirement, one of which being that these matters should be 
14 
done in a prompt and expeditious fashion. If that requirement 
is not construed as being mandatory, then there could be 
instances where an officer or the Driver License Division does 
not act on a sworn report for months or years after the reported 
incident takes place. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff-appellant 
requests that the Court find that the State of Utah did not meet 
their burden of proof in presenting all of the jurisdictional 
facts necessary before the District Court in opposition to the 
petition to have his driver's license reinstated. As a result 
of not meeting the burden of proof, the Court should have granted 
the petition reinstating the plaintiff's driving privileges. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT 
TO QUESTION THE PLAINTIFF CONCERNING PRIOR 
DUI ARRESTS. 
As referenced in the Statement of Facts, the Court 
allowed the respondent's attorney to ask Mr. Moore if he had 
ever been arrested for a DUI. After overruling the objection 
for relevancy, the Court allowed the attorney for the respondent 
to ask Mr. Moore as to whether or not the officer in the prior 
case contended that he was not blowing properly (T. 51). Over 
objection by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Moore was required to 
answer the question that the officer had previously contended 
that he had not blown properly into the machine. Counsel for 
the plaintiff then made a motion to strike the entire line of 
questioning based upon the fact that it was inadmissible hearsay 
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w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n , a r g u i n g t h a t i f t h e Court a l lowed the 
e v i d e n c e t o be r e c e i v e d / t h e Court would have to base i t s 
d e c i s i o n on i n a d m i s s i b l e hearsay e v i d e n c e . The Court denied 
the motion to s t r i k e the evidence. 
In t h i s case the Court may have poss ib ly been correct 
in r u l i n g t h a t Mr. Moore's p r i o r knowledge of the i n t o x i l y z e r 
machine may have been r e l e v a n t t o t h e c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s . 
However , t o do t h i s t h e Court would have to f ind t h a t the 
r e l e v a n c e outweighed the undue prejudice of evidence concerning 
h i s p r i o r a c t s of m i s c o n d u c t . Notwi ths tand ing the l i m i t e d 
r e l e v a n c e of t h i s l i n e of q u e s t i o n i n g , i t was c l e a r l y error to 
r e q u i r e Mr. Moore t o e i t h e r admit or deny the o u t - o f - c o u r t 
d e c l a r a t i o n s made by the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r in h i s prior case . 
Those d e c l a r a t i o n s were not introduced by means of any wri t ten 
or e v i d e n t i a r y documents but merely in the form of hearsay 
e v i d e n c e to which Mr. Moore was required by the Court to e i ther 
a g r e e or d i s a g r e e with as far as the c o n c l u s i o n s of another 
party. 
The q u e s t i o n s of Mr. Moore were c l e a r l y inappropriate 
under the Rules 403, 404 and 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
I l l 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUSTAIN THE COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT HAD 
MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
In the case of Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d 778 
(Utah, 1986), the Supreme Court indicated that a district court 
must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the 
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petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the 
provisions of this chapter. In that case the Supreme Court 
indicated that it would give deference to the trial court's view 
of the evidence unless the trial court has misapplied principles 
of law or its findings are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. 
Plaintiff-appellant submits that the findings of the 
court here are clearly against the evidence and that the evidence 
did not support the conclusions reached by the court. The 
officer that filled out the DUI Report Form, which the Court 
concluded constituted a sworn report of refusal, only had 
personal knowledge that Mr. Moore consented to take the test. 
When Officer Sullivan asked Mr. Moore to take the test, he 
indicated that he would take the test. 
The other officer testified as to two areas which th*e 
plaintiff-appellant submits are inconsistent. First, he 
testified that in his opinion, Mr. Moore was not blowing into 
the machine. However, he later testified that the red error 
light was coming on and that from the time he first asked Mr. 
Moore to blow into the machine until the error light came on, 
a period of time of only five seconds had elapsed. The officer 
testified that the machine had two lights upon which he was 
basing h^s conclusions—the green light for the air sample and 
the red error light. The officer was not an expert familiar 
with the machine and there was not evidence introduced to show 
whether or not the machine was malfunctioning. 
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In light of these inconsistent facts, the plaintiff-
appellant submits that the Court should find that the trial court 
should have required sufficient documentation before giving 
weight to the testimony of the officer to the extent that the 
Court sustained the Driver License Division's ruling. There 
was no evidence of any check record or the checklist which the 
officer said that he prepared and tore up after he believed that 
Mr. Moore had refused to take the test. Nor was there any 
evidence from any of the experts who regularly maintained the 
machine as to whether or not the machine was malfunctioning on 
the time and date in question. 
In addition, the plaintiff-appellant requests the Court 
to review carefully page 34 of the transcript. In that portion 
of the transcript, the officer testified that in the space of 
several seconds, there was enough time for him to put the tube 
up again to the plaintiff's mouth, require him to take a short 
sample, remind him to blow again into the air tube and then tell 
him that if he did not blow, he could lose him license. After 
that, the red error light came on and the officer deemed that 
Mr. Moore had refused to take the test. 
Therefore, a review of the facts in the brief 
transcript of the hearing will indicate that the trial court 
made findings which are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence and that much of the evidence which the trial court 
gave great weight should not even have been admitted because 
18 
of the lack of foundation concerning the scientific equipment 
used for breath testing. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing brief/ the plaintiff-
appellant requests that the Court enter an order finding that 
the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff-appellant's motion 
made at the close of the case on direct by the defendant-
respondent to grant the relief requested in the petition and 
enter an order remanding this matter back to the District Court 
for reinstatement of the plaintiff-appellant's driving privileges 
in relation to the incident at issue in this case 
Dated this cL day of September, 
IDALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Bruce M. Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this day of September, 
1987. 
ADDENDUM A 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — 
Refusal to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court 
action on revocation — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test 
available — Who may give test — Evidence, (a) Any person operating 
a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose 
of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combina-
tion of alcohol and any drug, provided that such test is or tests are admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe such 
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug. A peace officer shall determine which of the aforesaid tests 
shall be administered. 
No person, who has been requested pursuant to this section to submit 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the 
right to select the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability 
of a peace officer to arrange for any specific test shall not be a defense 
to taking a test requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in any crimi-
nal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to 
submit to the requested test or tests. 
(b) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests provided for in subsection (a) of this section and refuses to submit 
to such chemical test or tests, such person shall be warned by a peace offi-
cer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests 
can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following 
this warning, unless such person immediately requests the chemical test 
or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test shall be given 
and a peace officer shall submit a sworn report that he had grounds to 
believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
or combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had refused 
to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (a) of this 
section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a peace officer 
to the effect that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the 
department shall notify such person of a hearing before the department. 
If at said hearing the department determines that the person was granted 
the right to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to 
such test or tests, or if such person fails to appear before the department 
as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for one year his 
license or permit to drive. Any person whose license has been revoked by 
the department under the provisions of this section shall have the right 
to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in 
the district court in the county in which such person shall reside. Such 
court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the 
matter for trial de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department 
and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case 
and to determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation 
under the provisions of this act. 
(c) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or 
tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in 
subsection (a) of this section, and the test or tests may be administered 
whether such person has been arrested or not. 
(d) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such 
test or tests shall be made available to him. 
(e) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person author-
ized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer 
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug 
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine 
or breath specimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or 
person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of 
a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace 
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospi-
tal or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune 
from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test 
is administered according to standard medical practice. 
(f) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician 
of his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or 
tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inabil-
ity to obtain such additional test shall not affect admissability of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, nor 
preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace 
officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(g) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical 
test or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult 
an attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, 
physician or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(h) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or 
tests under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be 
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts 
alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug. 
